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Abstract
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Executive Summary
Protests that began in October 2019 led to the resignation of the government and a call 
for early elections in Iraq. Parliament responded by slowly agreeing a new elections law 
and setting a provisional date for dissolution. The new law means candidates will run on 
a first-past-the-post system and creates 83 electoral districts that replace the 18 provincial 
ones. This should ensure better accountability as MPs will have to be local residents, but 
there were few other positive changes. Without more electoral reform that makes it easier 
for new parties and younger candidates to enter politics and better regulates parties and 
their financing, the current political elite will continue to have advantages and prevent 
radical change.
Elections are provisionally set for October 2021, but questions remain as to whether the 
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) will be ready in time and can prevent 
fraud and irregularities as happened with previous elections. While publicly supporting 
the push for early elections, most political parties do not actually want them and have 
already delayed them several times. If elections are postponed again, they are likely to be 
held on the regular schedule in April or May 2022.
New parties have been formed that are sympathetic to the protest movement, but they 
face an uphill struggle to have an impact as the establishment looks to co-opt them. It is 
highly unlikely that these parties will win any significant number of seats. However, they 
represent a new politically active generation in Iraq, which will fully unfold in coming 
years. Some protestors are calling for a boycott of the elections as they do not believe they 
will be credible under the current conditions. Given the low turnout in 2018 and the poor 
economic, security and political climate since then, it is likely that voter participation in 
the upcoming elections will be very low. This will put into question the legitimacy of the 
political system and potentially lead to more protests, especially if there are credible con-
cerns around fraud.
With a low turnout benefitting established parties, we are thus likely to witness a repeat 
of the last elections, with populist movements like Fateh and the Sadrists capturing the 
highest number of seats. The fragmentation and competition the new law brings will make 
the government formation process more complicated. What is more, the next elections 
will see a preservation of the status quo, allowing the political elite to remain in power 
and ruling out any significant reforms. The upcoming elections are unlikely to be game 
changers in themselves. However, in the event that they are severely undermined or in 
the very improbable scenario where reformist parties are empowered, they could lead to 
major changes in Iraq’s future.
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ملخص البحث 
يف  مبكرة  انتخابات  إىل  والدعوة  الحكومة  استقالة  إىل   2019 األول  أكتوبر/ترشين  يف  بدأت  التي  االحتجاجات  أدت 
العراق. رد الربملان باملوافقة عىل قانون انتخابات جديد وتحديد موعد مؤقت لحل الربملان. و يقيض القانون الجديد 
83 دائرة  الفائز األول  أغلبية األصوات  وينشئ  االنتخابات وفق أن املنصب للحاصل عىل  إىل أن املرشحني يخوضون 
انتخابية تحل محل الـ 18 محافظة. ومن شأن ذلك أن يكفل مساءلة أفضل ألن أعضاء الربملان سيتعني عليهم أن يكونوا 
من السكان املحليني، ولكن التغيريات اإليجابية األخرى كانت قليلة. فبدون املزيد من اإلصالح االنتخايب الذي يجعل من 
السهل عىل األحزاب الجديدة واملرشحني األصغر سناً الدخول يف السياسة و تنظيم األحزاب ومتويلها عىل نحو أفضل، 
سوف تظل النخبة السياسية الحالية تتمتع مبزايا ومتنع أي تغيري جذري.
لقد تّم تحديد االنتخابات مؤقتاً يف أكتوبر/ترشين األول 2021، ولكن تظل التساؤالت قامئة حول ما إذا كانت املفوضية 
العليا املستقلة لالنتخابات )IHEC( سوف تكون جاهزة يف الوقت املناسب، وهل هي قادرة عىل منع التزوير واملخالفات 
كام حدث يف االنتخابات السابقة. ويف حني أن معظم األحزاب السياسية تؤيد علناً إجراء انتخابات مبكرة، إال أنها ال 
الجدول  أن تجرى يف  املرجح  االنتخابات مرة أخرى، فمن  تأجلت  الواقع بل وقد أخرتها عدة مرات. وإذا  تريدها يف 
الزمني املعتاد يف نيسان/أبريل أو أيار/مايو 2022.
وقد تشكلت أحزاب جديدة متعاطفة مع حركة االحتجاج، ولكنها تواجه رصاعاً شاقاً من أجل إحداث تأثري يف الوقت 
الذي تتطلع فيه األحزاب القامئة الحتضانهم. و من املرجح أن هذه األحزاب لن تفوز بعدد كبري من املقاعد، ولكنها متثل 
جيالً صاعداً ناشطاً يف العراق والذي سوف يتجىل بوضوح يف السنوات القادمة. ويدعو بعض املتظاهرين إىل مقاطعة 
االنتخابات ألنهم ال يعتقدون أنها ستكون ذات مصداقيّة يف ظل الظروف الحالية. وبالنظر إىل تراجع نسبة املشاركة يف 
االنتخابات يف عام 2018 وضعف املناخ االقتصادي واألمني والسيايس منذ ذلك الحني، فمن املرجح أن تكون املشاركة 
يف االنتخابات املقبلة منخفضة جداً. وهذا من شأنه أن يشكك يف رشعيّة النظام السيايس، ومن املحتمل أن يؤدي إىل 
املزيد من االحتجاجات، وال سيام إذا كانت هناك مخاوف تتعلق بالتزوير.
إن تراجع نسبة املشاركة يف االنتخابات سيخدم األحزاب الكبرية  وعىل هذا فمن املرجح أن نشهد تكراراً لالنتخابات 
األخرية، وتحصل األحزاب الشعبوية مثل الفتح والتيّار الصدري عىل أكرب عدد من املقاعد. إن ما يجلبه القانون الجديد 
من تجزئة وتنافس سيجعل عملية تشكيل الحكومة أكرث تعقيداً. ويف هذا الصدد، ستشهد االنتخابات املقبلة الحفاظ 
عىل الوضع الراهن، والسامح للنخبة السياسية بالبقاء يف السلطة وتأخري أي إصالحات هامة. ومن غري املرجح أن تُغري 
االنتخابات القادمة قواعد اللعبة، ولكن يف حال قوضت بشدة، أو تم متكني األحزاب ذات امليول اإلصالحية –وهو أمر 
غري وارد- فقد تؤدي نتائجها اىل تغريات كربى يف مستقبل العراق.
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Introduction
Amid the many crises Iraq is facing, reform of the political system and restoring trust, 
legitimacy and accountability in and of the Iraqi state is perhaps the most crucial. 
The country has witnessed protests in the capital and southern cities on the back of 
a struggling economy, poor governance as a result of rampant corruption, and violent 
suppression of dissent by government forces. There is a real possibility that discontent 
spreads nationwide, with the political elite attempting to curb public anger through tepid 
reforms. Protests and their fallout are also being used by parties to weaken their rivals 
by politicising reforms. Iraq is nominally a parliamentary democracy and the battle for 
political superiority between the various parties and factions culminates in elections held 
every four years.1 After every national election held since 2005 there has been a protracted 
government formation process and significant shifts in political and security dynamics 
that changed the fortunes of the state. The aftermath of the 2018 elections saw an unsta-
ble alliance between the Islah and Fateh coalitions, which unravelled less than a year 
later and led to the fall of the Adel Abdul Mahdi government, with the withdrawal of two 
subsequent prime ministerial nominees and a new government led by Mustafa al-Kadhimi 
finally approved in May 2020. 
A key part of the Kadhimi government’s agenda was to push through early elections ahead 
of May 2022, when elections would usually be held. This, along with the approval of the new 
elections law in November 2020, was a tepid concession to protestors’ demands.2 It came 
almost a year after the initial draft was passed, however political wrangling over key parts 
of the law prevented it from passing in full.3 Currently elections are scheduled for October 
2021, meaning Iraq is entering a crucial and highly competitive phase of the political cycle.
This paper aims to assess what the next elections will look like and whether they will lead 
to a paradigm shift in Iraq’s fortunes. To this end, fieldwork was conducted in Baghdad 
throughout February 2021, which included 17 interviews with MPs and political leaders, 
public intellectuals and government critics, officials in the Independent High Electoral 
Commission (IHEC) and the current government, prominent activists and protest coor-
dinators, and new entrants into the political system. 
This paper begins with an analysis of the elections law, including a look at the major 
changes and the impact these will have on the current political order. It also assesses 
when elections could happen, and the outstanding issues on the Supreme Court and the 
IHEC, the body assigned to oversee elections. One critical question is what impact, if any, 
protestors from the October movement who have mobilised and entered the elections 
1   Hamzeh al-Shadeedi and Erwin van Veen, ‘Iraq’s Adolescent Democracy: Where to Go from Here’, 
Clingendael Institute Report, June 2020. Available at https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-
06/iraqs-adolescent-democracy.pdf (accessed 17 April 2021).
2   Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ‘Iraq Ratifies New Election Law, Paving Way for Early Vote’, Associated Press, 
5 November 2020. Available at https://apnews.com/article/baghdad-iraq-elections-laws-bd32c013a9c-
3c537793803d78377576a (accessed 17 April 2021).
3   Falih Hassan and Alissa J. Rubin, Iraq’s New Election Law Draws Much Criticism and Few Cheers’, 
The New York Times, 24 December 2019. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/24/world/mid-
dleeast/iraq-election-law.html (accessed 17 April 2021).
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process will have on its outcome. Another surrounds the views of those critical of the 
elections. Thoughts are offered on what voter turnout might look like and what election 
results are to be expected. The paper concludes with implications for Iraq’s future after 
the elections and possible pathways. 
Analysing the New Elections Law
The elections law that will govern the next elections was ratified by President Barham Salih 
on 5 November 2020.4 The Kadhimi government had been pushing for early elections to 
fulfil their public promises of political reform, with 6 June 2021 initially proposed.5 Protests 
had put pressure on parliament to produce a fairer, more accountable elections system that 
would encourage new and smaller parties to compete, giving voters better representation 
and shaking up the Muhasasa ethno-confessional power-sharing system in place since 2003. 
Eventually the parties relented and agreed one significant change, converting the format 
from coalitions elected across 18 provincial districts to candidates and parties standing in 
83 electoral districts. The electoral system is now based upon a single non-transferable vote 
(SNTV) system, leading to a first-past-the-post race in each constituency. This means that 
voters will choose an MP from their own residential districts for the first time, rather than 
choosing a political coalition or candidate at the provincial level. Parties will need to put 
candidates forward who are well regarded in their electoral district, and constituents will be 
able to hold MPs representing their areas to account as candidates must be local residents. 
However, these changes are unlikely to have a negative impact on the larger, established 
parties who can mobilise votes across provinces. Parties who are well represented locally 
and have extensive networks will benefit from the division of provinces into electoral 
districts, and will do even better where they have strong candidates in rural areas. This is 
because some lightly populated sub-districts have been merged with others to reach the 
threshold of 100,000, as per the constitutional requirement for the MP-to-citizens ratio. 
Due to such mergers, a party which can mobilise effectively in one rural area may capture 
a seat in an electoral district made up of several areas in which they may not be as well 
represented. This will also affect urban districts with mixed communities. For example, in 
Baghdad, some areas with a mainly Sunni-identifying population have been merged with 
others that are majority Shiʿa and more populous. This is set to make it more difficult for 
Sunni candidates to win a seat in those areas, whereas before they only needed sufficient 
votes at the provincial level. The zoning of electoral districts has been criticised for not 
taking into account the latest population data, relying on old population figures rather 
than mandating a new census. This has had a negative impact at the provincial level. For 
example, despite its growing population there will be four fewer MPs in Basra than before. 
One positive impact of the new law is that popular politicians can no longer use their 
 .Elections Law for the Iraqi Parliament], Government of Iraq, 2020] ’قانون انتخابات مجلس النواب العراقي‘   4
Available at https://moj.gov.iq/upload/pdf/4603.pdf (accessed 17 April 2021).
5   ‘Iraq PM calls early election for June 6, 2021’, Reuters, 31 July 2020. Available at https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-iraq-politics-election-idUSKCN24W2S6 (accessed 17 April 2021).
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commanding vote share to award seats to other candidates on their list who did not win 
their seats outright. This will force greater competition in each district and could see some 
prominent names drop out of the elections altogether. One prominent coalition leader 
has decided not to run as a candidate in the elections, remarking that his vote tally would 
now be worthless to his coalition, whereas before 20 MPs got their seats on the back of 
votes for him.6 Other well-known politicians may also decide not to run as their name 
recognition has little value beyond gaining their solitary seat.
Unfortunately the changes will not lower the barrier to entry for new politicians and 
parties. Firstly, there has been no significant reform of the Political Parties Law which 
favours the status quo, making it difficult for new parties to be formed and compete with 
existing parties who will not have their funding and background examined in the same way 
as new entrants. Second, the minimum age for candidates is set at 28, disenfranchising 
many young aspiring politicians supportive of the protest movement. Third, the finances 
required to form a party and run in elections are vast for any new or grassroots party.
IHEC is the body responsible for registering parties and candidates. It charges 30 million 
Iraqi dinars (IQD) to register a new party (around $20,500 at the exchange rate at time of 
writing), 2m IQD per founding member (with a minimum of 5 such members), requires 3000 
signatures across 3 provinces supporting the new party, and a 350-person minimum general 
member conference attended by IHEC. To enter elections, each candidate must pay 10m IQD 
($6,833), of which half is refundable if they win a seat. This means if a party were to register 
candidates to compete for 320 seats (not including the 9 reserved for minorities) across the 
country, it would need 3.2bn IQD, well beyond the means of any new entrants and favouring 
the current established parties who have access to large funds. These expenses are such a 
barrier that one new party decided to field just a few candidates in 5 provinces instead of the 
original 100 candidates envisaged, and another new political group close to the protest move-
ment abandoned plans to enter the elections altogether, unable to raise sufficient funds.7
Much criticism of the final iteration of the law surrounds how far it has shifted from 
earlier, fairer, drafts into a version that supports the current political elite.8 The biggest 
concerns are around gerrymandering and the domination of certain parties in some dis-
tricts, guaranteeing them votes and preventing proper competition, and thus reinforcing 
current power-sharing structures. In the words of one legal expert: ‘the dangers of the 
multi-districts election system ... is that it would lead to empowering those who have arms 
in hands, have plenty of cash, and have tribal or ethnic support.’9 
The new elections law only applies to national elections – the draft local elections law 
was not passed and there is no current timeline for when these will be scheduled. The last 
local elections were held in 2013 and at least three national elections will have been held 
by the time of the next local ones. This creates a dissonance between local and national 
6   Interview with political coalition leader, Baghdad, February 2021.
7   Interviews with new party officials in Baghdad, February 2021.
8   Omar al-Jaffal, ‘Iraq’s New Electoral Law: Old Powers Adapting to Change’, Arab Reform Initiative, 12 
January 2021. Available at https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/iraq-elections/ (accessed 17 April 2021).
9   Dana Taib Menmy, ‘Iraq’s New Election Law Undermines True Democracy’, Inside Arabia, 12 Novem-
ber 2020. Available at https://insidearabia.com/iraqs-new-election-law-undermines-true-democracy/ 
(accessed 17 April 2021).
Sajad Jiyad 11 
level representation, power dynamics and alliances, and maintains the current control of 
local government by the political elite, which is facing increasing anger.
When will Elections Take Place?
IHEC was expected to take at least six months to prepare for elections.10 After ratification 
of the election law in November 2020, there were still other major steps required. The first 
was to pass the bill funding IHEC, allowing it to begin work, which was legislated on 17 
December 2020.11 The second was to either amend the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) Law 
or legislate a new one.12 This was necessary as the FSC is the body tasked with ratifying elec-
tion results as per Article 93 of the Iraqi Constitution, but had lost quorum since May 2020 
due to the retirement of two justices with no agreement on how they would be replaced.13 
The depth of political disputes over how the FSC would be reconstituted soon made it clear 
that the FSC Law amendment would take months to resolve – it was eventually passed on 
19 March 2021.14 The new FSC was unveiled on 29 March 2021 and ratified by the president.15
By January 2021 it became clear that holding elections in June 2021 was not feasible from a 
technical perspective, so the IHEC suggested to the government a new date of 16 October 
2021.16 The Kadhimi cabinet accepted the IHEC’s request for postponement and settled 
on 10 October 2021 as the new date for elections.17 This is six months before regular elec-
tions were due to be held, considered sufficiently far in advance to meet the criteria of 
‘early elections’.
While the cabinet has voted for 10 October 2021, the matter is still not settled. From a pro-
cedural point of view, the president has to issue a decree announcing the date of elections 
10   Omar Sattar, ‘Iraqi parliament votes on final version of electoral law’, Al-Monitor, 2 November 
2020. Available at https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/11/iraq-elections-law-parliament.html 
(accessed 17 April 2021).
 Law on Ratification of the Convention] ’قانون تصديق اتفاقية تجنب االزدواج الضريبي ومنع التهرب من دفع الضرائب‘   11
on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Tax Evasion], Government of Iraq, 2020. Available 
at https://moj.gov.iq/upload/images/222927_4610.pdf (accessed 17 April 2021).
12   Amjad Hamed Al-Hathal, ‘Early Elections in Iraq: Challenges and Pathways’, Al-Bayan Center for 
Planning and Studies, September 2020. Available at https://www.bayancenter.org/en/wp-content/
uploads/2020/09/8793892.pdf (accessed 17 April 2021).
13   ‘Iraq’s Constitution of 2005’, Constitute Project. Available at https://www.constituteproject.org/consti-
tution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en (accessed 17 April 2021).
 Law of the First Amendment (Order] ’قانون التعديل االول )االمر رقم 30 لسنة 2005م( قانون المحكمة االتحادية العليا‘   14
No. 30 of 2005 AD) Law of the Federal Supreme Court], Parliament of Iraq, 18 March 2021. Available at 
https://ar.parliament.iq/2021/03/18/قانون-تعديل-قانون-المحكمة-االتحادية-ا/ (accessed 17 April 2021).
-The Judiciary Announces the Com] ’القضاء يعلن اكتمال تشكيل المحكمة االتحادية ورفع األسماء لرئيس الجمهورية‘   15
pletion of the Formation of the Federal Court and the Nomination of the President of the Republic], 
Al-Mirbad, 29 March 2021. Available at https://www.almirbad.com/detail/83106 (accessed 17 April 2021).
16   Omar Sattar, ‘Iraqi parties scramble ahead of new October election date’, Al-Monitor, 20 January 2021. 
Available at https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/01/iraq-elections-government-parliament.html 
(accessed 17 April 2021).
17   ‘Iraqi cabinet votes to delay general election until October 10’, Al-Jazeera, 19 January 2021. Available 
at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/19/iraqi-cabinet-votes-to-delay-general-election-until-octo-
ber-10 (accessed 17 April 2021).
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at least 90 days beforehand. As per the Constitution, early elections can only take place 
once the Council of Representatives is dissolved, which requires an absolute majority vote 
of MPs or one third with the prime minister and president’s approval. After dissolution 
elections are to be held within 60 days. The UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) is 
currently providing support to the IHEC at the request of the Iraqi government to help 
prepare for elections, and while it publishes monthly progress reports and its opinion 
is important (with the government reliant on UN technical assistance), it has not com-
mented on whether October 2021 remains a feasible date.18
As it stands there are two deciding factors for whether elections will take place in October 
2021. The first is technical, with the main concern that the IHEC will not be ready in time. 
The 2018 elections witnessed serious allegations of fraud and incompetence, leading to 
a manual recount and placing the IHEC under judicial supervision. Since then the IHEC 
has seen most of its staff dismissed, judges appointed by the judiciary as commission-
ers despite little experience in organising elections, and the organisation is yet to recruit 
enough election workers and supervisors. Voter registration has progressed slowly, with 
only 63 percent of eligible voters registered as the extended deadline passed on 15 April.19 
The IHEC had already twice postponed the voter registration deadline amid concerns 
that millions of potential voters would be disenfranchised.20 The Commission is also still 
figuring out operational aspects of the elections such as how the ‘special vote’ for security 
forces will be conducted, the format of the ballot paper, and the choice of auditors and 
computer systems, though it has decided that Iraqi expatriates living abroad will not be 
able to vote.21 A current IHEC official agreed that it was unlikely the technical preparations 
would be completed in time, suggesting April 2022 as a more realistic date, which would 
put the elections back to the regular timeline.22 Whether the IHEC will ever reach a state 
of adequate preparedness is debatable, as concerns mount over its ability to manage elec-
tions properly and avoid the fraud that has plagued previous elections.23 With the current 
setup and capacity of the IHEC, election irregularities are to be expected. 
The second factor is political, with parties publicly supporting early elections but in reality 
dragging their feet as they maximise time to prepare for the change in the elections pro-
cedure, while MPs aim to see out their full term.24 Parliament must vote to dissolve itself 
for early elections to happen and it will not do so until the technical aspects are fulfilled. 
18   ‘Iraq’s Electoral Preparations and Processes reports’, UN Iraq. Available at https://www.uniraq.
org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=itemlist&layout=category&task=category&id=207&Item-
id=738&lang=en (accessed 17 April 2021).
19   ‘Iraq’s Electoral Preparations and Processes - Report No. 7’, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, 
9 April 2021. Available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNAMI_Report_No._7_
on_Iraqs_Electoral_Preparations_and_Processes.pdf (accessed 17 April 2021).
للناخبين‘   20 البايومتري  التسجيل  تمديد  تقرر   The Commission Decides to Extend the Biometric Voter] ’المفوضية 
Registration], Al-Sumaria, 31 March 2021. Available at https://www.alsumaria.tv/news//377780/سياسة
.(accessed 17 April 2021) المفوضية-تقرر-تمديد-التسجيل-البايومتري-للناخبين
21   ‘IHEC decides not to hold OCV Elections…’, The Independent High Electoral Commission, 24 March 
2021. Available at https://ihec.iq/7786-2/ (accessed 17 April 2021).
22   Interview with current IHEC official, Baghdad, February 2021.
23   Lizzie Porter, ‘Iraq postpones elections, haunted by 2018 debacle’, Iraq Oil Report, 21 January 2021. 
Available at https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/iraq-postpones-elections-haunted-by-2018-deba-
cle-43486/ (accessed 17 April 2021).
24   Interviews with MPs, Baghdad, February 2021.
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One way to avoid public pressure to dissolve itself is to push through a conditional vote, 
outlining that providing the technical aspects are resolved and a date is firmly set, parlia-
ment will dissolve a few days before this, with 7 October 2021 recently suggested by MPs.25 
Of course, while this ticks the box from parliament’s perspective in terms of ensuring 
early elections, it does not guarantee they will happen. Parties have further prevaricated by 
delaying registration of candidates and coalitions as required by the IHEC, which has been 
forced to postpone the deadlines several times already. Another stalling tactic has been to 
avoid the debate over whether to continue with the current IHEC set up (as seems likely) 
or draft a new law and vote in new commissioners (which is not necessary to hold elec-
tions, but could be raised to force a delay). A third is raising cases to the Supreme Court 
challenging or asking for clarifications on aspects of the elections law. 
Iraq is now witnessing a spiralling number of COVID-19 cases, with weak health infra-
structure and low adherence to public health regulations having seen the beginning of a 
new wave. This also has the potential to push back the election date.
Protest Movement Mobilisation and New Parties
As the October protest movement ramped up in late 2019, some protestors met with gov-
ernment officials in the following months with the aim of highlighting their demands and 
maintaining a line of communication to prevent further clashes. Some activists and protest 
coordinators were soon co-opted by the parties and are now part of their election cam-
paigns, either under new party names or existing ones.26 Such moves were denounced by 
other protestors who could not see any way for reforms to happen within existing power 
structures. Other protest leaders formed new parties independently, with the aim of repre-
senting the younger generation dissatisfied with the country’s current political system. Both 
of these cases represent a small segment of the protest movement, less than 15 percent, 
and admit they are viewed very negatively by those sympathetic to protests.27 They have 
opted for parliamentary politics, however, because they see no possibility for protests to 
push through reforms outside the political system. This difference in strategy has led to a 
schism, with protestors who support the revolution calling for elections to be boycotted.28 
The entry of protest-sympathetic parties into elections is viewed as having potential rele-
vance only if there is more coordination between the various groups.29 This would lead to 
increasing vote share and thus having a seat at the table in government formation.
Not all new parties are a rehash of existing ones or come from the protest movement. The 
IHEC will eventually complete the registration of over 300 parties for the upcoming elec-
25   Sajad Jiyad, ‘Conditional dissolution of parliament, this gets the parties off the hook publicly while in 
private they continue to delay elections’, Twitter, 1 April 2021. Available at https://twitter.com/SajadJi-
yad/status/1377418471416336385?s=20 (accessed 17 April 2021).
26   Interviews with officials in new parties, Baghdad, February 2021.
27   Interviews with protest leaders and new political party officials, Baghdad, February 2021.
28   Erik K. Gustafson and Omar Al-Nidawi, ‘Iraqi protesters’ perilous journey to the ballot box’, Middle 
East Institute, 22 March 2021. Available at https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraqi-protesters-peril-
ous-journey-ballot-box (accessed 17 April 2021).
29   ‘Iraq’s new protester parties plan to change the country’, DW, 22 January 2021. Available at https://www.
dw.com/en/iraqs-new-protester-parties-plan-to-change-the-country/a-56312305 (accessed 17 April 2021).
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tions.30 According to one current political party leader with over 20 MPs in parliament, 
new faces entering politics is a positive development, even if some of them are co-opted 
by the political elite, as this will lead to a generational change eventually.31 Another prom-
inent politician in the Fateh coalition believes that ‘protest’ parties may not win seats, but 
they will become a force in years to come as long as they can mobilise votes the way the 
current top parties can.32 This would call for an evolution of organisation, coordination, 
influence and campaigning. Some new parties have been formed out of encouragement, 
support and meetings with the Marjaiya, who believe participating in elections is the only 
way of reforming the political system.33 While they have no formal ties to Ayatollah Sistani, 
the fact that new parties have been formed in Shiʿa heartlands with his quiet blessing is a 
further rebuke against the existing parties, of which he has been highly critical.
New parties will struggle to shake up the status quo and the existing elite will do all they 
can to prevent change.34 Part of this counter-action is through co-optation, intimidation 
and politicised legal action.35 Mobilising support for the new parties will be the most dif-
ficult challenge. Though there is wide dissatisfaction with the ruling elite, turning public 
support into electoral gains for new parties that have limited experience and resources 
seems unlikely.36 One pathway is to compete for the female vote. Iraq operates a 25 
percent gender quota system in parliament, so young female candidates may benefit from 
the large numbers of women who participated in protests, tired of seeing the same male 
faces in Iraq’s political patriarchy. Another pathway is to use social media to engage young 
people, as happened during the protests, and to encourage tactical voting or individual 
alliances in sub-districts to maximise votes for new parties.
Even if new parties do not pick up many seats they may be able to lay the groundwork for a 
shift in campaigning, alliances, voting and politics in general. As more Iraqis begin to focus 
on issues rather than identity and economic prosperity becomes the key concern, new 
parties with a diverse ethno-confessional membership equipped with radical new policies 
could change the language of politics. With over 60 percent of the Iraqi population under 
30 years of age, there is potential to reach a new demographic, born after 2003 and just 
now reaching voting age. In a way, these elections may prove to be a testing ground for 
new non-traditional parties, and the real changes could happen two or three elections 
from now as young voters mature. By then identity politics may be much less relevant 
30   ‘Iraq’s Electoral Preparations and Processes - Report No. 6’, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, 
8 March 2021. Available at https://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&task=down-
load&id=4239_c12c2f4962233fe6ffb7bbbbf7eae8b3&Itemid=738&lang=en (accessed 17 April 2021).
31   Interview with party leader, Baghdad, February 2021.
32   Interview with MP from Fateh, Baghdad, February 2021.
33   Interview with new party official with informal ties to the Marjaiya, Baghdad, February 2021.
34   Alex Shanahan, ‘Iraqi Protests and the 2021 National Elections’, Washington Report on Middle East 
Affairs, May 2021, pp. 56–7. Available at https://www.wrmea.org/waging-peace/iraqi-protests-and-the-
2021-national-elections.html (accessed 17 April 2021).
35   ‘Iraq’s Saddam-era laws being used to silence critics’, France 24, 23 March 2021. Available at https://
www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210325-iraq-s-saddam-era-laws-being-used-to-silence-critics 
(accessed 17 April 2021).
36   Georgia Cooke and Renad Mansour, ‘Iraqi Views on Protesters One Year After the Uprising’, Chatham 
House, 29 October 2020. Available at https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/10/iraqi-views-protest-
ers-one-year-after-uprising (accessed 17 April 2021).
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as issue-based politics, on which Iraqis of all backgrounds are much aligned, comes to 
dominate public discourse. This generational shift is already underway, but the upcoming 
elections may be too soon to witness its full impact.
What Turnout and Results Could Look Like
The last national elections in 2018 had an official turnout of 44.52 percent, but in many 
areas the figure was much lower and the accuracy of that figure is in doubt. Since then 
there have been violent clampdowns on protests, increased public anger with the sluggish 
economy and devaluation of the Iraqi dinar, tens of thousands of young people graduat-
ing with no job prospects, tensions as the Iran-US conflict plays out in the country, and 
political dysfunction that has seen one government’s resignation, two fail to be formed, 
and several crucial laws delayed. These developments have sapped public confidence in 
government and the political system, with polls showing that high numbers do not believe 
elections will be fair or fundamentally alter government performance.37 One could logi-
cally conclude that turnout is unlikely to be higher than before and may even be lower, 
especially if not all eligible voters are registered on time. This view is shared by some polit-
ical leaders, with one prominent party leader flirting with the idea of calling for a boycott 
as he believes elections in the current trajectory will be disastrous, further empowering the 
current leading parties in Fateh and the seemingly defunct Islah bloc.38 Despite the change 
in the election format, perceptions that the government is unable to impose the rule of 
law and prevent political intimidation have also seen independents call for a boycott, 
further depressing turnout expectations.39
Though some data points to a desire to see new parties and younger candidates, the public’s 
general negative outlook is predicted to lead to a diminished turnout.40 This would have 
serious repercussions on the legitimacy of Iraq’s political system. With confidence in elec-
tions already affected, a low turnout may lead to skewed results and accusations of fraud. 
This could encourage new protests and violent clashes as happened after the last elections 
in 2018.41 If the national average drops under 40 percent, it will be among the lowest turn-
outs for parliamentary elections worldwide.42 Given Iraq’s current problems, this will only 
exacerbate domestic tensions and put other countries in a difficult position as to how they 
can continue to support the ruling system if it has so little support from the population.
37   Munqith Dagher, ‘Uprising or Election: What Kind of Change Do Iraqis Want?’, Fikra Forum, 12 March 
2021. Available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/uprising-or-election-what-kind-
change-do-iraqis-want (accessed 17 April 2021).
38   Interview with party leader, Baghdad, February 2021.
39   Al-Jaffal, ‘Iraq’s New Electoral Law: Old Powers Adapting to Change’.
40   ‘New Iraq Poll: Despite Distrust in Institutions, Iraqis Value Democratic Process’, International 
Republican Institute, 15 December 2020. Available at https://www.iri.org/resource/new-iraq-poll-de-
spite-distrust-institutions-iraqis-value-democratic-process (accessed 17 April 2021).
41   Aref Mohammed and Raya Jalabi, ‘Protesters torch political party offices in Basra’s fourth night of 
violence’, Reuters, 6 September 2018. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/iraq-protests-idINK-
CN1LM0MG (accessed 17 April 2021).
42   ‘Voter Turnout by Country’, IDEA. Available at https://www.idea.int/data-tools/world-view/40 
(accessed 17 April 2021).
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A higher turnout would be a welcome development that could improve the political land-
scape through renewed public trust in politics and a stronger mandate for government. 
The low turnout, combined with the district level seat allocation will mean a low thresh-
old for votes to win a seat. This will increase competition among the larger parties as seats 
in some districts will become easier to win than before, guaranteeing that they dominate 
results. Government formation will, however, be more difficult as these parties tend to 
be opponents and have struggled to form governments before. The ability of parties like 
the Sadrists and those in Fateh like Asaʾib Ahl Al-Haq to mobilise their vote and combine 
urban and rural support across provinces will see them improve their showing. If they 
can ensure their existing base turns out, they will pick up more seats even in the absence 
of more votes as other parties struggle with the low turnout and to compete with locally 
popular candidates.
Several politicians interviewed believed the Sadrists will do well in the elections along 
with Fateh, their rivals. At the moment Sadrists are likely to be aligned with former Islah 
coalition members such as Iraqiyoon and Nasr, as well as new parties like Marhala and 
Waai. This pits them against Fateh, who are attempting to retain Speaker Mohamed al-Hal-
bousi in their alliance.43 Sunni and Kurdish parties will be more likely to support a unity 
government than split their allegiances this time around, in the hope of avoiding a polar-
ised government along pro or anti-Iran lines. In terms of possible prime ministers several 
names were suggested in interviews, with Ali Al-Shukri, Adnan Al-Zurfi and Mohammad 
Al-Sudani seen as front runners depending on which coalition came out on top. The 
current Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi was seen as highly unlikely to retain his posi-
tion.44 The absence of a kingmaker like Qasem Soleimani or a widely respected statesman 
to force a consensus will lead to protracted negotiations, especially if the results lead to 
an artificially high number of seats for one or two coalitions.
The concerns around skewed results, where some parties are overrepresented in parliament, 
are also having an impact on political coalitions, as the established parties seek to widen 
their potential voter base to prevent groups like the Sadrists and Fateh from increasing their 
seat share.45 The concern is that these populist parties will usher in hardline governments, 
less inclined towards reform, and exacerbate Iraq’s economic crises. This concern also 
extends to foreign governments who are worried that Hashd al-Shaʿabi (Popular Mobilisa-
tion Forces)-aligned parties (primarily those in Fateh) could become the dominant political 
force as they are well-equipped to mobilise supporters and will benefit from a low turnout 
to get a larger share of seats. This could lead to the formation of a very pro-Iran government, 
making the relationship with the US much more complicated.46 In addition, a government in 
Baghdad that is too close to Iran could undermine the Iraqi state, leading to counter-moves 
by domestic and foreign players which would further destabilise the country.
43   Jeremy Hodge and Anand Gopal, ‘The Rise of the New Sunni Elite in Iraq: The Case of Fallujah’, LSE 
Conflict Research Programme Blog, 16 November 2020. Available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/11/16/
the-rise-of-the-new-sunni-elite-in-iraq-the-case-of-fallujah/ (accessed 17 April 2021).
44   Interviews with Islah and Fateh MPs, Baghdad, February 2021.
45   Alaa Kadhem, ‘Iraq’s Newest Political Bloc And Implications For The Next Election’, 1001 Iraqi 
Thoughts, 22 July 2020. Available at https://1001iraqithoughts.com/2020/07/22/iraqs-newest-political-
bloc-and-implications-for-the-next-election/ (accessed 17 April 2021).
46   Interview with a Western diplomat, Baghdad, February 2021.
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The Post-Election Future
The current situation suggests that there will not be an outright winner in the forthcom-
ing elections. This is because no single party has country-wide support or is able to gain 
more than 100 seats. As a result, rival parties will need to form a coalition government, 
a process that will take several months. In all likelihood this will lead to a poor perform-
ing government and a failure to deal effectively with the many crisis that the country is 
facing. But if election results force parties to accept the need for real reforms and give 
the state a chance to recover from severe corruption and dysfunction, this could lead 
to a period of relative stability. If a new government is sufficiently empowered to make 
rule of law a priority, then the political system may survive with incremental steps to 
improve governance and inclusivity. This could happen even if the elections are entirely 
undermined due to fraud and/or low turnout, or if they produce an upset with new 
parties become kingmakers.
Three pathways are available post-election, the first being further instability and delegit-
imisation of the current order, on the back of more protests and a struggling economy. 
This could occur with a low turnout and decisive wins for Fateh or the Sadrists, or wide-
spread fraud or impropriety. The second is stagnation – postponing a collapse but without 
improving the situation in any way, merely preventing it from getting much worse. This 
would happen if results are not decisive, a weak coalition government is formed and some 
turnover in parliament occurs. The third pathway is gradual reform that sees the political 
order accommodate change to survive. Here new parties would have made solid gains, on 
a high turnout and with a major shift in the government formation process.
Conclusion
Polling to be released in the coming months will give more accurate estimates of what 
election results could look like, but a safe assumption is that there will not be any dramatic 
change from the previous elections. The ruling elite may accommodate some new faces 
and could strike a grand bargain that prevents the parties from being polarised further, but 
competition will always be around the corner. The ruling parties will seek to compete and 
undermine each other without losing their grip on the system, striking a balance between 
fighting with the inner enemy and closing ranks against external competitors. In this 
regard, the upcoming parliamentary elections in Iraq will not be game-changers. 
The elections may however be the starting point for a slow shift towards improvements 
in the political system and eventually governance. A change in the elections law was one 
small step forward and if new parties gain a foothold by picking up over 20 seats, and 
some semblance of legitimacy in elections is maintained, this would be a portend of pro-
gress. But if the change is too slow, the risk remains that the fragile system will simply 
collapse. Therefore, the rate of reform and change as a result of this election could be 
the metric by which Iraq’s stability is measured. The months to follow may not immedi-
ately matter much, but could be looked back upon as having had a decisive impact in the 
decades to come.
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